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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying Stanford credit towards his 
$500,000 limited guaranty, and a discharge of his guaranty obligation, for the $750,000 in 
personal payments he made to the Parks pursuant to his guaranty where courts have 
uniformly held that a guarantor should receive credit for payments he personally makes to 
a lender. 
On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of review used by the court of 
appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual 
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. In the context of a summary judgment 
motion, which presents a question of law, this Court employs a correctness standard and 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to Stanford as the non-moving party. Dowling v. Bulleiu 2004 UT 50, f 7, 94 P.3d 915. 
Stanford preserved this issue for appeal below during briefing and a hearing before 
the trial court. (R. 155; 159; 168-171; R. 781 Hearings Tran. at 1-4; 9-11; 25-26.)1 
1
 Citation conventions in this brief are as follows: "R." is the abbreviated reference 
to the record on appeal, "Ex." refers to an exhibit included in this briefs addendum, and 
"Op." refers to the Court of Appeals5 opinion in this case. 
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2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding there were no disputed 
issues of fact as to whether Stanford had directed that his payments to the Parks be 
applied towards his $500,000 limited guaranty where the evidence demonstrates that the 
Parks demanded that Stanford pay them pursuant to his guaranty once Snowmass 
defaulted, where Stanford paid the Parks over $750,000 of his personal funds, where 
Stanford alerted the Parks that he was paying them in his caipacity as guarantor and not as 
Snowmass, where Stanford paid the Parks with a cashier's or personal check, and where 
none of Stanford's payments to the Parks came from a Snowmass bank account. 
On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of review used by the Court of 
Appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual 
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. In the context of a summary judgment 
motion, which presents a question of law, this Court employs a correctness standard and 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to Stanford as the non-moving party. Dowling, 2004 UT 50. 
Stanford preserved this issue for appeal below during briefing and a hearing before 
the trial court. (R. 155; 159; 168-171; R. 781 Hearings Tran. at 1-4; 9-11; 25-26.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
No Constitutional or statutory provisions are dispositive for purposes of resolving 
the questions presented on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case presents an issue of first impression for this Court: should a guarantor be 
denied credit for payments he personally makes to a lender under a limited guaranty. In 
this case, Stanford gave a maximum guaranty of $500,000 on a corporate borrower's 
debt. When the borrower, Snowmass Corporation, failed to fulfill its obligation, the 
Parks demanded payments from Stanford as guarantor and Stanford paid the Parks over 
$750,000 of his own funds to honor his limited guaranty. Notwithstanding Stanford's 
payments were in excess of his personal guaranty, and which payments should have 
discharged his personal guaranty, the Parks sought, and received, a judgment against 
Stanford for an additional amount in excess of one-million dollars. In total, Stanford has 
paid, or has become obligated to pay, approximately $1.75 million on a $500,000 
guaranty, an amount which the Court of Appeals upheld. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
The Parks initiated this case by filing a Complaint against Stanford seeking to 
recover $500,000 plus interest pursuant to Stanford's guaranty. The Parks pursued this 
claim against Stanford even though Stanford had already paid them over $750,000, 
despite having guaranteed a maximum of $500,000 of Snowmass' debt. 
Soon after filing their Complaint, the Parks moved for partial summary judgment 
seeking a determination that: (1) Stanford was liable to them based upon his guaranty, and 
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(2) Stanford was not entitled to offset over $750,000 in personal payments against that 
guaranty. 
The Parks filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking a final judgment 
against Stanford based on his guaranty. Stanford opposed the Parks' motions claiming 
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether his personal payments to the 
Parks should be credited towards his personal guaranty. Hearings on the Parks' summary 
judgment motions were held before Judge Quinn of the Third Judicial District Court on 
March 13, 2006 and April 29, 2008. 
HI. Disposition Below 
At the March 13, 2006 hearing, Judge Quinn concluded as a matter of law that 
none of Stanford's payments could be applied towards his $500,000 guaranty. Judge 
Quinn stated that since there was no evidence that Stanford had directed the Parks to 
apply his personal payments towards his guaranty, he was not entitled to an offset of those 
payments as matter of law. The court issued an order reflecting this ruling. (A copy of 
this order is included in this briefs addendum as Exhibit "A.") 
At the April 29, 2008 hearing, Judge Quinn granted the Parks' motion for 
summary judgment and entered judgment against Stanford in the total amount of 
$1,009,872.35 despite the fact that Stanford had previously paid over $750,000 of his 
personal funds to the Parks. (A copy of the Judgment is included in this briefs addendum 
as Exhibit "B.") The judgment was comprised of $500,000 in principal, $508,463.91 in 
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interest on the principal amount, and $1,408.44 in costs. Stanford filed a notice of appeal 
on July 2, 2008. 
On October 29, 2009, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the 
trial court's ruling that Stanford was not entitled to credit payments he made to the Parks 
against his limited personal guaranty. (A copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion is 
included in this briefs addendum as Exhibit "C") 
In its ruling, the court held that a guarantor cannot be given credit for payments he 
makes to a lender unless the parties had previously agreed how the guarantor's payment 
should be applied. In support of this new rule, the Court of Appeals adopted Lee v. Yano, 
997 P.2d 68 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000), a case which presented entirely different facts from 
the present case. In its decision, the court also rejected the rule set forth in analogous 
cases that a guarantor should receive credit towards his guaranty for payments he makes 
directly to the lender. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals held as matter of law that there was no evidence in 
the record that Stanford and the Parks had an agreement in place as to how the Parks were 
to apply Stanford's payments. 
IV. Statement of Facts 
A. Stanford's Involvement in the Parks' Real Estate Transaction 
1. On April 1, 1994, Gary B. Stanford ("Stanford") and Richard Buckway 
("Buckway") entered into a real estate purchase contract ("REPC") with Kang and 
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Marsha Park (the "Parks") to purchase a commercial real estate property (the "Property"). 
(R.210.) 
2. As part of the REPC5 Stanford and Buckway agreed to assume the Parks' 
obligation on a Security Mutual Life Insurance Company Deed of Trust debt ("Security 
Mutual Note") which encumbered the Property. (Op. at f^ 2.) 
3. In October of 1994, the parties agreed that Snowmass, LC ("Snowmass") 
would replace Stanford and Buckway as the purchaser of the Property. (R. 202.) 
4. The Parks' attorney prepared a Trust Deed Note dated July 1, 1995, which 
limited Stanford's personal guaranty liability to $500,000 exclusive of interest and costs. 
(R. 4.) 
B, Stanford's Personal Payments to the Parks Pursuant to his Guaranty 
5. After taking possession of the Property, Snowmass began making payments 
to the Parks pursuant to the REPC. (R. 202.) 
6. In 1994 and 1995 Snowmass missed several of its payments. (R. 159; 203-
205.) 
7. When Snowmass failed to make these payments, Mr. Park contacted 
Stanford directly to demand payment based on Stanford's personal guaranty. (R. 205; 
211-261.) 
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8. Mr. Park sent twenty letters to Stanford requesting that Stanford personally 
make Snowmass' payment to the Parks pursuant to Stanford's personal guaranty. (R. 
241-261.) 
9. Park's letters are not addressed or directed to Snowmass, but rather to 
Stanford and Buckway in their capacity as personal guarantors of Snowmass' debt. (R. 
241-261.) 
10. In response to Park's letters, and to honor his personal guaranty, Stanford 
made payments to the Parks in excess of $750,000. These payments were made to fulfill 
the Parks' obligation under the Security Mutual Note, Snowmass' obligation under the 
Security Mutual Note, Snowmass' payment obligation under the 1995 Trust Deed, and 
Stanford's guaranty of the July Trust Deed. (R. 160; 206; 263-280.) 
11. When Stanford sent payments to the Parks in response to their demand, he 
did so using personal checks from his personal checking account rather than checks 
drawn on Snowmass' checking account. (R. 270-273.) 
12. On some of the checks he sent to the Parks, Stanford wrote the notation 
"Gary Stanford" to signal that the payments were from him personally and not Snowmass. 
(R. 274.) 
13. At times Stanford would transfer his own funds into Snowmass' bank 
account so that Snowmass could make its payment to the Parks. (R. 159.) 
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14. None of the payments Stanford made to the Parks came from Snowmass' 
funds, but rather all of them came from Stanford's personal funds in accordance with his 
guaranty. 
15. Stanford believed that his personal payments to the Parks would be credited 
towards his guaranty. (R. 161; 207.) 
16. Had Stanford known that the Parks were not crediting his personal 
payments towards his guaranty, Stanford would not have paid the Parks over $750,000 of 
his own money. (R. 161; 207.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Stanford was not entitled to credit the 
$750,000 in payments he made to the Parks and a discharge of his $500,000 guaranty 
unless there was an express agreement providing for such credit. Stanford contends that 
this ruling should be reversed for three reasons. 
First, as courts in numerous analogous cases have done, Utah should adopt a rule 
which grants guarantors credit for payments they make to lenders pursuant to their 
guarantees. Second, the court denied Stanford credit for his payments to the Parks based 
on its adoption of a rule set forth in a case where the question was whether a third-party 
guarantor could control a lender's application of a borrower's payment, as opposed to the 
facts of this case where Stanford is seeking credit for payments he personally made to the 
Parks. And third, by denying guarantors credit for payments they make to lenders, the 
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court has adopted a rule which will have a chilling effect on lending practices within this 
State by prejudicing guarantors. 
The Court of Appeals also erred by ruling that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether there was an agreement between the Parks and Stanford which 
required that Stanford's $750,000 in payments be applied towards his $500,000 limited 
guaranty. The record is replete with facts which show that the Parks demanded payment 
from Stanford in his personal guarantor capacity, that Stanford paid the Parks in his 
personal guarantor capacity, and that the Parks knew that Stanford was paying them as a 
personal guarantor and not as Snowmass. These facts should have precluded the Court of 
Appeals' ruling that Stanford was not entitled to credit for the payments he made to the 
Parks as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
L STANFORD, LIKE OTHER GUARANTORS, SHOULD RECEIVE 
CREDIT FOR PAYMENTS THEY MAKE TO A LENDER 
PURSUANT TO THEIR LIMITED GUARANTY 
The Court of Appeals should have adopted a rule of law in this State which 
requires a lender to give a guarantor credit towards his personal guaranty for payments the 
guarantor, and not the primary borrower, makes to the lender. In denying Stanford credit 
and a discharge for the payments he made to the Parks, the Court of Appeals relied on the 
general rule that a guarantor cannot control the application of a borrower's payment to a 
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lender unless there is an agreement regarding such application. This ruling is erroneous 
in three respects. 
First, the court should have adopted the rule announced in analogous cases that a 
guarantor should receive credit for his payments to a lender. Second, the court's holding 
relies on a rule which is inapplicable to the present case. And third, the court's ruling will 
have a profoundly prejudicial effect on lending practices within this State. 
A. The Court Of Appeals Should Have Adopted The Rule That A 
Guarantor Should Receive Credit For Payments He Makes To A 
Lender Pursuant To His Guaranty 
In cases where a guarantor, and not the borrower, makes a payment to a lender, 
courts have consistently given the guarantor credit for his payments. In such cases, the 
courts' inquiry is not on whether the guarantor and lender have an agreement as to how 
the guarantor's payments will be applied. Rather, the courls' inquiry is on whether the 
guarantor made the payment to the lender and whether the lender knew it was receiving 
payments from the guarantor. In denying Stanford credit for his payments to the Parks, 
the Court of Appeals disregarded these cases without any substantive analysis or 
discussion. 
The Court of Appeals first minimized the facts and legal issue presented in 
Monmouth Plumbing Supply Co. v. McDonald 147 A. 627 (N.J. 1929). In Monmouth, 
the issue was whether a guarantor had satisfied his limited guaranty obligation when he 
made personal payments to the lender in an amount exceeding his limited guaranty. The 
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Monmouth court concluded that where the guarantor had made payments directly to the 
lender, the lender was required to offset those payments against the guarantor's guaranty. 
Id. at 628. The fact that the guarantor made the payment was the critical inquiry in the 
court's analysis, and not whether the guarantor and lender had an agreement controlling 
application of the guarantor's payment. Monmouth was the only case presented by either 
party which presents similar facts and legal issues to this case. 
As in Monmouth, Stanford guaranteed a borrower's (Snowmass) debt to a lender 
(the Parks). (R. 4.) As in Monmouth, Stanford's guaranty was limited to a fixed amount 
of $500,000. (Id.) As in Monmouth, Snowmass was unable to make the payments to the 
Parks. (R. 205; 211-261.) As in Monmouth, the Parks requested that Stanford make 
Snowmass' payment as its guarantor. (Id.) As in Monmouth, Stanford made payments to 
the Parks on behalf of Snowmass with his own money in order to honor his personal 
guaranty. (R. 160; 206; 263-280.) As in Monmouth, the amount Stanford paid to the 
Parks exceeded his guaranty maximum of $500,000 where he paid them in excess of 
$750,000. (Id-) And as in Monmouth, the Parks brought an action against Stanford for a 
debt which Stanford has already paid. 
Stanford contends that Monmouth provides the proper analysis for deciding this 
case. As set forth above, the facts are nearly identical to those of this case where the issue 
is whether Stanford extinguished his $500,000 limited guaranty obligation by paying the 
Parks $750,000 of his own funds. As in Monmouth, the controlling fact in this case is 
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that Stanford, not Snowmass, made the payments to the Parks and therefore Stanford 
should receive credit for those payments and a discharge of his debt. The Court of 
Appeals' requirement there be an agreement in place between the Parks and Stanford is 
irrelevant in light of the fact that Stanford, as a personal guarantor of Snowmass, made 
the payments to the Parks. Monmouth provides the most helpful analysis for this case and 
pursuant to Monmouth, the Court of Appeals should have given Stanford credit for his 
$750,000 payments to the Parks.2 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' newly adopted rule that an agreement must exist 
between the parties before a guarantor can receive credit for his payments to a lender is 
contrary to the general rule stated in other significantly analogous cases. 
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Inc. Co. v. Dakota Elec. Supply Co., 309 F.2d 22 (8th 
Cir. 1962), the Eight Circuit reiterated the general rule that a borrower may direct how his 
payment is applied if he communicates that intent before or at the time of payment. Id. at 
25. The court noted that if the borrower fails to so indicate, the lender may apply the 
payment however she wants. Id. Judge Blackmun, writing for the Eight Circuit, noted 
2
 The Court of Appeals dismissed Monmouth without any consideration or analysis. 
The court's reason for this was that "no court in any jurisdiction has cited Monmouth for 
any purpose, let alone for the rule that Stanford suggests." (Op. at f^ 13.) 
While it is true that Monmouth has not been cited by other courts, it has also not been 
overturned within its own jurisdiction or called into question in any other jurisdiction. 
The fact that no court has cited Monmouth is not a sufficient basis for ignoring its clear 
applicability to the present case. 
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that an exception to these general rules applies where the guarantor himself makes a 
payment to the lender. Id. 
The St. Paul court emphasized that when a guarantor makes payments to a lender 
on behalf of a borrower, that fact is the equitable circumstance which justifies an 
exception from the general rules governing the application of payments. Rather than 
focusing on whether the parties had an agreement as to how the guarantor's payments 
would be applied, the court focused on whether it was the guarantor who made the 
payments, and if so, whether the lender knew the payment it received came from the 
guarantor. Id.3 
The Court of Appeals' requirement that Stanford and the Parks have an agreement 
controlling how parties should apply Stanford's payments is erroneous in light of both 
Monmouth and St. Paul. As Judge Blackmun wrote, the guarantor receives credit for his 
payment to the lender if the lender knows the payments came from the guarantor. As set 
forth infra in section II, the record is replete with evidence that the Parks knew that the 
payments Stanford made were from Stanford and not from Snowmass. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals erred in not only requiring that an agreement be in place for Stanford to 
3
 The Court of Appeals' analysis of St. Paul was limited to a footnote wherein the 
court stated that St. Paul is inapplicable because it has "different facts than in this case." 
(Op. at f 8, n.3.) The court did not consider Lee to be unpersuasive based on its admitted 
"different factual scenario." (Id. at f^ 13.) 
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receive credit for his payments, but in also ignoring the evidence that the Parks knew 
Stanford was personally making payments as a guarantor. 
Both Monmouth and St. Paul set forth the rule the Court of Appeals should have 
adopted in this case. Like this case, those cases involve guarantors seeking credit for 
payments they themselves made, rather than trying to control how a lender applied a 
borrower's payment. Pursuant to Monmouth, once Stanford paid the Parks $500,000, his 
guaranty liability was extinguished. And pursuant to St. Paul the Parks should have 
credited Stanford for his payments when the evidence demonstrates that the Parks knew 
Stanford made the $750,000 of payments as Snowmass' guarantor.4 The Court of 
Appeals' errors should therefore be reversed. 
B. The Court Of Appeals Has Adopted A Rule In This State 
Governing A Guarantor's Payments Which Is Based On A Case 
Where, Unlike This Case, The Issue Was Whether A Guarantor 
Could Control A Lender's Application Of A Third-Party 
Borrower's Payment 
The Court of Appeals erred in deciding this issue of first impression by basing its 
opinion on Lee v. Yano, 997 P.2d 68 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000). In adopting Lee, the court 
stated that it believed that "the rule stated therein regarding application of payments from 
4
 See also Hyland Elec. Supply Co. v. Franchi Bros. Construction Corp., 378 F.2d 
134, 139 (2d Cir. 1967)(stating that when a creditor knows the surety is the source of 
funds it receives from a debtor, the creditor must apply those funds to the guaranteed 
debt); Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co. v. Moran Construction Co., 296 N.W. 
761 (Neb. 1941) (holding that a lender must apply a debtor's payment to guaranteed debt 
if the lender knows that the guarantor is the source of those funds.) 
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a guarantor to a lender should be adopted in Utah." (Op. at f 13.) The problem with 
adopting this rule is that Lee did not involve the question of how a lender should aply a 
guarantor's payment. Rather, the issue was whether a guarantor could control how a 
lender applied a third-party borrower's payment. The Court of Appeals' oversight of this 
critical factual difference tainted its holding. 
In Lee, an ex-husband had two separate debts with the plaintiff and gave a 
promissory note guaranteed by Francis Yano ("Yano"), who promised to pay the plaintiff 
on one of those debts. Id. at 70. The ex-husband eventually failed in his obligations and 
the plaintiff brought an action seeking payment from Yano as guarantor. Id. at 71-72. 
Yano contended that the plaintiff should have applied her ex-husband's payments to the 
debt which Yano had guaranteed rather than the other debt which he had not guaranteed. 
Id. at 70. 
On appeal, the Hawaii Court of Appeals noted that in the case of a debtor and 
creditor "[i]t is elementary that in the absence of agreement, and in the absence of 
direction from the borrower, the creditor may apply payments [from the borrower] to any 
obligation he holds. Equally clear, if there be no provision to the contrary, the debtor may 
designate the application of payment and the creditor must comply with such direction." 
Id. quoting Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. McCormick. 102 F.2d 305, 315 (1939). 
Using this language, the Hawaii court held that since there was no evidence of any 
specific agreement covering the application of payments on the ex-husband's debts or 
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evidence that the ex-husband instructed the plaintiff to apply his payments to the part of 
his debt guaranteed by Yano, the Plaintiff was authorized to apply her ex-husband's 
payments in any manner she wished, even to Yano's detrimient. Id. at 149-150. The court 
then stated that general rule that "a third person who is secondarily liable on a debt, such 
as a guarantor . . . cannot control the application which either the debtor or the creditor 
makes of a payment, and neither the debtor nor the creditor need apply the payment in the 
manner most beneficial to such persons." Id at 150.5 
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Lee is misplaced. Lee's rule is appropriate in 
cases where a borrower makes a payment to a lender and a guarantor requires that the 
lender apply the borrower's payment to the guarantor's guaranteed debt. Lee is not 
instructive, however, in cases such as this one where a guarantor is seeking credit for 
payments he himself makes to a lender. If Stanford was trying to control the Parks' 
application of payments which Snowmass made then the Lee ruling would be appropriate. 
However, those are not the facts of this case,6 
5
 The Lee court cites the Tenth Circuit's decision in Mid-Continent Supply Co. v. 
Atkins & Potter Drilling Corp., 229 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1956), wherein the court stated the 
general rule that where a creditor holds different obligations of a debtor, some of which 
are guaranteed by third-parties, unless otherwise directed by the debtor, the creditor may 
apply the proceeds of a payment made by the debtor to the obligation or obligations not 
guaranteed. 229 F.2d at 76 (emphasis added). 
Like Lee, Mid-Continent Supply Co. is inapposite to this case where Stanford is 
not seeking to direct application of payments Snowmass made towards his guaranty, but 
rather, Stanford is seeking credit for payments he himself made as guarantor. 
6
 The Court of Appeals noted that Lee "involved a slightly different factual 
scenario," yet failed to recognize the implications of those factual differences. (Op. at f 
16 
By adopting Lee as the rule of law in Utah, the Court of Appeals has set a legal 
precedent which does not address the facts of the cases it purports to resolve. While 
Stanford does not dispute the correctness and reasoning behind the Lee rule, Stanford 
does dispute its application to the present case. If allowed to stand, the Court of Appeals' 
decision is useless in future cases involving a guarantor seeking credit for payments he 
makes directly to a lender because Lee is not premised on a guarantor making the 
payment. The Court of Appeals has established a precedent which prejudices all 
guarantors. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed. 
C The Court Of Appeals' Adoption Of The Lee Rule Will Have A 
Chilling Effect On Lending Practices Within This State 
The Court of Appeals should also be reversed where its decision will have severe 
lending policy implications. The Court of Appeals' decision denies a guarantor any credit 
for payments it makes pursuant to the guaranty unless the guarantor either inserts 
language into the guaranty specifying that his payments will be applied towards his 
guaranty or tells the lender each time he makes a payment that he wants it credited 
towards his guaranty. Both of these requirements will have a chilling effect on lending 
practices because guarantors will be weary of guaranteeing loans. 
These new requirements saddle guarantors with the responsibility of ensuring that 
their payments are credited to their guaranty. Stanford contends, however, that such 
13.) 
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requirements are illogical. Guarantors enter into guarantees assuming that their payments 
will be applied towards their guarantees. And no guarantor makes personal payments to 
the lender believing the lender will not credit the payment towards his guaranty. If the 
Court of Appeals' ruling stands, guarantors in this State now have no assurance that their 
payments will be credited towards their guaranty amount. Moreover, lenders may now 
refuse to credit a guarantor's payments by simply alleging lhat the guarantor never told 
them he was making the payment pursuant to his guaranty. 
There should be no other way to interpret a guaranty than the guarantor should 
receive credit against his guaranty for his personal payments. The Court of Appeals' 
ruling opens the door to sharp lending practices which may cause guarantors to lose 
millions of dollars in payments they reasonably expect the lender to apply to their 
guaranty. Stanford contends that such a result would not only be inequitable, but would 
also dissuade individuals from ever guaranteeing a loan, thereby preventing lenders from 
making loans. These policy reasons demand that the Court of Appeals' decision be 
reversed. 
II. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SHOULD HAVE 
PRECLUDED THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE 
PARKS AND STANFORD DID NOT HAVE AN AGREEMENT 
REGARDING STANFORD'S PAYMENTS 
The Court of Appeals erred in both adopting and applying Lee. As set forth above, 
the court should not have relied on Lee in deciding this case. However, even if Lee was 
the appropriate rule of law in this case, the facts of this case did not support a grant of 
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summary judgment on the question of whether the Parks should have applied Stanford's 
payment to his guaranty. 
In the context of summary judgment, this Court "view[s] the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Dowling, 2004 UT 50, ^ 6. The Court of Appeals justified its ruling by stating 
that "even assuming that Stanford intended that these payments be credited towards his 
guaranty, there is no record evidence that he and the Parks had agreed to do so." (Op. at f 
14.) That is simply not the case. Pursuant to the relevant standard of review, the Court of 
Appeals' decision should be reversed. 
In this case, the facts show that the Parks knew that Stanford was the source of 
over $750,000.00 in payments to them, or at the very least, the facts demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact as to this issue. The record is replete with evidence that the 
Parks knew that Stanford was paying them in his guarantor capacity and not as 
Snowmass. Once Snowmass was delinquent with its monthly payments to the Parks, Mr. 
Park contacted Stanford to request that he honor his guaranty and make the payments on 
behalf of Snowmass. (R. 1; 205; 241-261.) 
Additionally, the record contains twenty separate letters that Mr. Park wrote to 
Snowmass' guarantors, Stanford and Buckway, demanding immediate payment. (R. 241-
261.) In each of those letters, Mr. Park addressed Stanford and Buckway who were the 
guarantors of the loan rather than Snowmass who was the obligor. (R. 241-261.) 
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While Mr. Park did not specifically address Stanford and Buckway as "guarantors" 
in his letters, at least part of the reason he addressed his letters to them personally, rather 
than to Snowmass, was to demand payment from them individually by virtue of being 
guarantors. The Parks5 letters to Stanford and Buckway demanding payment is exactly 
the type of action one takes when the primary borrower has failed to make a payment, the 
creditor demands payment from the guarantors. 
Furthermore, when Stanford sent payments to the Parks he often did so using his 
personal checks, rather than checks drawn on Snowmass' bank account. (R. 270-273.) A 
few of the checks Stanford sent were cashier's checks which included the notation "Gary 
Stanford" on the check. (R. 274.) One of the cashier's checks made payable to Mr. Park 
had the notation "Snowmass Highland/ Dr. Stanford." (R. 275.) And just one check had 
the notation "Snowmass" on it. (R. 276.) These checks, none of which was drawn on a 
Snowmass account, weakens any argument the Parks have made that Stanford was paying 
them in any other capacity than as Snowmass' guarantor. 
The fact that Mr. Park sent Stanford and Buckway a letter each time Snowmass 
was delinquent with its payment is evidence that the Parks were demanding payment from 
Stanford as a guarantor. The fact that Stanford sent money to the Parks using his own 
personal checks rather than Snowmass checks is evidence that the Parks knew Stanford 
was paying them as a guarantor. The Parks never received any payment from Stanford 
drawn on a Snowmass account. Stanford has also alleged that Mr. Park demanded that 
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Stanford pay him based on Stanford's personal guaranty. (R. 205; 211-241.) The 
cumulative effect of these facts is that the Parks knew the payments they received from 
Stanford came from him in his capacity as an individual guarantor, and not on behalf of 
Snowmass. 
Moreover, as detailed above, the proper analysis was whether the Parks knew the 
payments Stanford was making were in his individual capacity and not as Snowmass. 
Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the Parks knew Stanford 
was making payments to them in his personal capacity as guarantor and the Court of 
Appeals' holding otherwise should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Stanford respectfully asks this Court to reverse the 
Court of Appeals' decision. 
DATED this fr& day of April, 2010. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
"**r' ; w i " - , - ^ ^ ,^—~°>C— 
Russell S. Walker 
Reid W. Lambert 
Anthony M. Grover 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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O R D E R 
Civil No 050900073 
judge Anthony B Quirui 
This matter came before the Couit on Monday, March 13, 2006, at 9 00 a m The plaintiff 
was represented by counsel Keith W Meade The defendant was lepresented by counsel M Darin 
Hammond 
The Court, having consideied the pleadings filed in connection with the plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, including all of the affidavits filed by the defendant, and having considered 
the discussion of counsel, and otherwise being advised in the matter, and for the additional reasons 
articulated by the Court dunng the course of the heating, 
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS 
1. The Court determines, as a mattei of law, that none of the payments made to date by 
Gaiy Stanford or Snowmass can be applied so as to reduce the $500,000 00 personal guaianty from 
Stanford to the plaintiffs 
2. The Court believes, at present, that it cannot determine as a matter of law that there 
would not be a deficiency judgment in favor of Security Mutual should Snowmass, LLC default on 
its obligation to Security Mutual, and for that reason, the Court denies the balance of the plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which requested a determination of the principal amount which 
remains owing on the defendant's personal guaranty. 
_*2 day of March? 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 
ithony B. Quinn 
District (26urt Judge ;' 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT : 
/ M. Darin Hammond 
Smith Knowles 
/I 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage fully prepaid, on the pep day of March, 2006, to the following: 
M. Darin Hammond 
SMITH KNOWLES 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
EXHIBIT "B" 
FILEB BISTRICT COUBT 
Third Judicial District 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813 
keiih@crslaw. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KANG S. PARK and MARSHA PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY B. STANFORD, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 050900073 
Judge: Anthony B. Quinn 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on Tuesday, April 29, 2008. The plaintiffs 
were represented by counsel, Keith W. Meade, of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal. The defendant was 
represented by counsel, M. Darin Hammond, of Smith Knowles. 
The Court, having considered the pleadings filed by the parties, as well as pleadings 
previously filed in this matter, as well as the argument of counsel, and having determined that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact based upon the pleadings previously filed and filed in 
connection with this motion, 
Judgment @J 
B y _ 
P.C. 
JUN - 3 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk-
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
DATE 
OP J U U U I V I C I N i o 
- « • < « . , . ? 
050900073 STANFORD, 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows 
1. The plaintiffs be and hereby are awarded judgment against the defendant, Gary B 
Stanfoid in the following amounts: 
a $500,000 00 principal, 
b $285,401 98 in accrued interest on principal through January 31, 
2008, 
c $190,722 95 in accrued interest on delinquent payments thiough 
January 31, 2008, and 
d $5,842 98 in accrued interest on late fees, said amount taking into 
consideration the $5,000 00 reduction set foith in the plaintiffs7 
January 3, 2007 Memorandum, and 
e $14,169 00 in additional accrued interest on pnncipal thiough Apnl 
30, 2008; and 
f $12,627 00 in additional accaied mteiest on delinquent payment 
through April 30, 2008 
The total of the foregoing is $1,008,463 91, togethei with judgment at the default late provided in 
the Note of 15% per annum, plus costs of collection 
2. hi addition, the plaintiffs have submitted a Memorandum of Costs, and the plaintiffs 
aie further awarded those costs in the amount of $1,408 44 
2 
3 The TOTAL JUDGMENT is $ 1,009,872 35 plus interest at the default rate of 15% 
per annum as provided for in the guaranteed note and writ of collection, all until paid 
4 It is FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs endoTseon the face nf the ouginal Note 
given by Snowniass, LLC to Secuuty Mutual Life Lnsuiance Company the following 'The right to 
obtain a deficiencyjudgment based on this Note has been waived pursuant to the judgment entered 
in Civil No 050900073 in the Third District Court, Salt Lake City, State of Utah in the mattei 
entitled Kavg S Pcukand Mcusha Pcukx Gary B Stanford" The cudoisement shall be placed on 
the Note as reflected in Exhibit "A" attached to this Judgment 
DATED thib ^ 7 day of Ivfery, 2008 
BY THE COURT-™^ . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undei signed heieby certifies that a true and conectcop} oi the foregoing JUDGMENT 
) 
was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the CA, day of May, 2008, to the following 
M Darin Hammond 
SMITH KNOVVLES 
4723 Harrison Blvd , Suite 200 
Ogden. UT 84403 
EXHIBIT "C" 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Kang S. Park and Marsha Park, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
Gary B. Stanford, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080574-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 29, 2009) 
2009 UT App 307 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050900073 
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn 
Attorneys: Russell S. Walker, Reid W. Lambert, and Anthony M. 
Grover, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Keith W. Meade and Bradley M. Strassberg, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Thorne. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
Hi Appellant Gary B. Stanford appeals the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Appellees Kang S. and Marsha 
Park. In particular, Stanford argues that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because the amount of his liability on the guaranty 
was ambiguous and because the trial court erred in determining 
that he was not entitled to credit toward his personal guaranty 
for payments he made prior to this action. Stanford also argues 
that even if summary judgment was appropriately granted, we 
should remand for the trial court to reduce the judgment entered 
against him in light of Utah Code section 57-1-32. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 The Parks owned commercial real estate in Ogden, Utah (the 
Property) that, as of March 1994, was encumbered by a trust deed 
securing an obligation of Kang S. Park to Security Mutual Life 
Insurance Company with a balance owed of approximately 
$266,484.40 (the Security Mutual Note). In April 1994, Stanford 
and Richard Buckway entered into a real estate purchase contract 
with the Parks (the REPC) whereby they agreed to pay $1,000,000 
to the Parks to purchase the Property.1 In conjunction with the 
REPC, Stanford personally guaranteed "the payment of $500,000 
plus interest." He also assumed liability on the Security Mutual 
Note. After execution of the REPC, the parties continued to 
negotiate terms for the sale of the Property, ultimately 
resulting in a trust deed and note executed July 1995, (the 1995 
Trust Deed Note), between the Parks as lenders and Snowmass, LC -
-a Utah limited liability company of which Stanford was a member-
-as Borrower. Snowmass also assumed liabiLity on the Security 
Mutual Note. In the 1995 Trust Deed Note, Stanford again 
personally guaranteed partial payment: 
Stanford agrees to unconditionally guarantee 
the payment of th[e 1995 Trust Deed N]ote, 
but in no event shall . . . Stanford's 
liability (excluding portions thereof 
attributable to interest and costs) when 
added to any deficiency judgment which may be 
entered against him by virtue of his guaranty 
of the Security Mutual [Note] (excluding 
interest and costs), exceed the sum of FIVE 
HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50 0,000). 
%3 In 1997, the parties amended the 1995 Trust Deed Note to 
provide that any notices of default could be sent directly to 
Stanford. When Snowmass missed several payments, the Parks sent 
Stanford requests for payment. These payments were ultimately 
made. After Snowmass further "defaulted in a number of material 
respects, including the failure to make payments under the [1995 
Trust Deed] Note," the Parks filed suit against Stanford seeking 
specific performance of his personal guaranty. 
f4 The trial court held three separate hearings--March 2006, 
February 2007, and April 2008--in an attempt to resolve the 
Parks' various motions for summary judgment. At the beginning of 
the March 2 0 06 hearing, the trial court noted that after reading 
the parties' memoranda, it was uncomfortabLe granting summary 
judgment because (1) Stanford's guaranty in the 1995 Trust Deed 
Note was "ambiguous, especially as it relates to how the Security 
Mutual [N]ote is handled," and (2) it appeared that there may be 
questions of fact regarding "whether or not Mr. Stanford should 
have credit for sums that were paid prior to th[e] time where 
demands were made directly to him as opposed to [Snowmass]." 
Stanford bought the Property with his business partner at 
that time, Richard Buckway. However, Buckway is not a party to 
this appeal and, for the reader's convenience, has been omitted 
from this opinion except where necessary for clarity. 
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After further argument by both parties, the trial court granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of the Parks, deciding that 
whether Stanford was entitled to credit for past payments is 
purely a question of law and that Stanford was not entitled to 
credit for these payments because he failed to notify the Parks 
that he intended them to be credited against his personal 
guaranty. The trial court refused to grant full summary 
judgment, however, due to issues involving the Security Mutual 
Note. The trial court ultimately granted the Parks' request for 
full summary judgment at the April 2 008 hearing because Bank of 
Utah, as custodian for the Kang S. Park IRA, had purchased all of 
Security Mutual's interests under the Security Mutual Note and 
agreed to waive any deficiency judgment thereunder to which they 
might otherwise be entitled. As a result, Stanford had no 
potential liability on the Security Mutual Note.2 Because the 
amount owing under the 1995 Trust Deed Note was undisputedly in 
excess of $500,000, the trial court entered judgment in favor of 
the Parks for $500,000 in principal plus interest, fees, and 
costs, totaling $1,009,872.35. Stanford appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Summary Judgment 
i|5 The thrust of Stanford's appeal is that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment because either the court made 
legal errors or there existed material factual disputes 
precluding summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriately 
granted where there are no material facts in dispute and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[A] motion for summary judgment may not 
be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity 
exists in the contract [at issue] and there is a factual issue as 
to what the parties intended." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 
UT 43, f 14, 48 P.3d 918 (internal quotation marks omitted). We 
"review[] a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or 
denial of summary judgment for correctness, and view[] the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 
% 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
2The Judgment ordered the Parks to endorse the Security 
Mutual Note as follows: "The right to obtain a deficiency 
judgment based on this Note has been waived pursuant to the 
judgment entered" in this case. 
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A. Integration 
%6 Stanford contends that the trial court incorrectly concluded 
that the 1995 Trust Deed Note is fully integrated, arguing that 
several documents evidencing the parties1 negotiations should be 
included in interpreting Stanford's personal guaranty. 
Specifically, Stanford argues that these documents demonstrate 
that the parties intended to limit the amount of his guaranty to 
a maximum of $500,000 inclusive of interest, fees, and costs. 
Because parol evidence is not allowed to interpret an integrated, 
unambiguous agreement, the first step in deciding whether to 
consider extrinsic evidence is determining whether the 1995 Trust 
Deed Note is integrated. See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 
2008 UT 20, f 11, 182 P.3d 326. 
To determine whether a writing is an 
integration, a court must determine whether 
the parties adopted the writing as the final 
and complete expression of their bargain. 
Importantly, . . . when parties have reduced 
to writing what appears to be a complete and 
certain agreement, it will be conclusively 
presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the 
writing contains the whole of the agreement 
between the parties. 
Id. % 12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In 
Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326, the 
supreme court reiterated that "[wjhether a contract is integrated 
is a question of fact reviewed for clear error." Id. % 10. 
Notwithstanding that standard of review, the Tangren court noted 
that extrinsic evidence would be allowed on the issue of 
integration, despite "a clear integration clause, where the 
contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in 
consideration, or where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress, 
mistake, or illegality." Id. K 15. The Tangren court further 
disavowed prior cases that may have allowed extrinsic evidence 
outside the enumerated types of allegations, holding that "we 
will not allow extrinsic evidence of a separate agreement to be 
considered on the question of integration in the face of a clear 
integration clause." Id. U 16. 
f7 Before the trial court, the Parks argued that the 1995 Trust 
Deed Note was fully integrated, particularly in light of the 
following clause: 
This [1995 Trust Deed] Note has been issued 
pursuant to and is secured by that certain 
Deed [entered contemporaneously with the 1995 
Trust Deed Note] between Borrower and Lender 
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(the "Security Instruments"). Such Security 
Instruments and all other instruments 
evidencing or securing the indebtedness 
hereunder are hereby made part of this Note 
and are deemed incorporated herein in full. 
Stanford's argument, in part, is that prior writings and 
negotiations between the parties should be admitted to determine 
the extent of Stanford's guaranty. Under Tanqren, this type of 
extrinsic evidence is not admissible where the agreement appears 
on its face to be integrated. 
%Q Stanford further argues, however, that the 1995 Trust Deed 
Note was not fully integrated, but instead, by its express terms, 
the 1995 Trust Deed Note "incorporated" all the documents 
previously entered into between the parties, including a series 
of letters sent by the Parks' attorney prior to execution of the 
1995 Trust Deed Note. Stanford further contends that these 
letters render his guaranty liability amount ambiguous because, 
in contrast to the 1995 Trust Deed Note, the letters appear to 
cap Stanford's guaranty liability at $500,000 inclusive of 
interest, fees, and costs. Stanford also appears to argue that 
the prior letters constitute "other instruments evidencing or 
securing the indebtedness hereunder," as stated in the 1995 Trust 
Deed Note. 
|^9 While the trial court did not explicitly find that the 1995 
Trust Deed Note was integrated, it implicitly did so. The 1995 
Trust Deed Note--and the "other instruments evidencing or 
securing the indebtedness [t]hereunder"--"appears to be a 
complete and certain agreement," see id. % 12, between the Parks 
and Stanford regarding Stanford's personal liability. 
Accordingly, we "conclusively presume[] . . . that [it] contains 
the whole of the agreement between the parties." See id. 
Furthermore, the prior letters are not instruments securing the 
debt as is the contemporaneous trust deed. At best, they reflect 
negotiations culminating in and replaced by the 1995 Trust Deed 
Note and address the same types of terms as those ultimately 
included in the 1995 Trust Deed Note. Having determined that the 
trial court did not err in finding the 1995 Trust Deed Note to be 
integrated, our discussion turns to a correctness review of the 
trial court's interpretation of the 1995 Trust Deed Note. 
B. Ambiguity and the Parties' Intent 
flO Once a court has determined that a contract is fully 
integrated, it may not rely on parol evidence in making its 
initial decision of whether the contract is facially ambiguous. 
See id. % 11. "A contractual term or provision is ambiguous 'if 
it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because 
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of uncertain meanings of terms, missing tearms, or other facial 
deficiencies.1" Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, % 25, 190 P. 3d 
1269 (quoting WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv, Corp., 2002 
UT 88, % 20, 54 P.3d 1139). If the contract is facially 
unambiguous, we are bound to determine the parties' intent solely 
"from the plain meaning of the contractual language." Flores v. 
Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, 1 8, 209 P.3d 428 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Furthermore, when reviewing a trial court's 
interpretation of a contract, "'we defer to the trial court on 
questions of fact but not on questions of law.1" Id. i| 7 
(quoting Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 1 14, 48 P.3d 
918). And finally, "[w]hether a contractual term or provision is 
ambiguous on its face is a question of lawf" to be reviewed for 
correctness. Id. (citing Daines, 2008 UT 51, % 25) . 
fll Stanford's contention regarding ambiguity in the 1995 Trust 
Deed Note focuses on integration and the parties1 prior 
negotiations and letters: Stanford makes no extensive argument 
that the language within the four corners of the 1995 Trust Deed 
Note renders his personal guaranty amount ambiguous. The 
guaranty provision in the 1995 Trust Deed Note clearly states 
that Stanford's liability will be $500,000 exclusive of interest, 
fees, and costs. Because none of the terms in the guaranty 
provision are "capable of more than one reasonable interpretation 
because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies," see Daines, 2008 UT 51, 1 25 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), we conclude that the guaranty provision 
in the 1995 Trust Deed Note is unambiguous as a matter of law. 
Summary judgment on this issue was therefore proper. 
Furthermore, because there is no dispute that the amount owed 
under the 1995 Trust Deed Note exceeded $500,000, we determine 
that Stanford's personal liability was correctly calculated at 
$500,000 plus interest, fees, and costs, for a total of 
$1,009,872.35. 
C. Credit for Past Payments 
|^12 Stanford also argues that the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in concluding that he was not entitled to credit toward 
his personal guaranty for payments he made prior to the filing of 
this action. Stanford asserts that "[w]hen [he] made personal 
payments to the Parks, he did so believing that the Parks would 
credit those payments toward [] his [personal] guarant[y] ." 
Implicit in this argument is the notion that Stanford made these 
payments in his capacity as a guarantor, as opposed to in his 
capacity as Snowmass's sole member. Whether Stanford is entitled 
to credit for these payments against his personal guaranty, based 
on his unexpressed belief that these payments would be so 
credited, presents an issue of first impression in Utah. 
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i|l3 Stanford cites Monmouth Plumbing Supply Co. v McDonald, 147 
A. 627 (N.J. 1929), arguing the rule m Utah should be that "when 
a guarantor makes a payment directly to the lender, that payment 
is credited against the guarantor's guaranty limit " However, as 
the Parks note m their brief, no court m any jurisdiction has 
cited Monmouth for any purpose, let alone for the rule that 
Stanford suggests. Alternatively, the Parks cite Lee v. Yano, 
997 P.2d 68 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000), and argue that the rule stated 
therein regarding application of payments from a guarantor to a 
lender should be adopted m Utah. In Lee, the Hawaii Court of 
Appeals cited secondary sources for the proposition that, 
11
 [a] s a general rule, a third person who is 
secondarily liable on a debt, such as a 
guarantor, surety, or mdorser, cannot 
control the application which either the 
debtor or the creditor makes of a payment, 
and neither the debtor nor the creditor need 
apply the payment in the manner most 
beneficial to such persons " 
Id. at 76 (quoting 60 Am. Jur 2d Payment § 88 (2003)) Although 
Lee involved a slightly different factual scenario, we believe 
that this statement of the law is persuasive and should be 
adopted as Utah law. Exceptions to this rule may exist, as 
acknowledged by the Parks, where there is a differing contractual 
provision or an agreement to accept payment from a guarantor upon 
the express condition that it be applied toward the guaranty 
amount, notwithstanding the principal debtor's continued 
vitality. Thus, because Stanford, as guarantor, cannot 
unilaterally control the way m which these payments were treated 
by the Parks, the relevant inquiry is whether he and the Parks 
had an agreement regarding acceptance of these payments and their 
specific application. 
fl4 However, even assuming that Stanford intended that these 
payments be credited toward his guaranty, there is no record 
evidence that he and the Parks had agreed to do so In fact, the 
undisputed facts of record belie such an assertion, most notably: 
(1) in 1997 the parties amended the 1995 Trust Deed Note so as to 
allow notices of default to be sent to Stanford's personal 
attention; (2) from 1998 on, Stanford was the sole member of 
Snowmass; (3) although payments were made, some allegedly with 
money from Stanford's personal account, the Parks had no 
knowledge that Stanford intended these payments to be directed 
toward his personal guaranty; and (4) there was no agreement by 
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the Parks to apply the payments to Stanford's guaranty.3 
Consequently, we affirm the trial court's determination that 
Stanford is not entitled to credit toward his personal guaranty 
for these payments. 
II. Utah Code section 57-1-32 
Hl5 Stanford argues that even if we affirm the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment, Utah Code section 57-1-32 requires 
that we remand this case to the trial court so that it may offset 
the fair market value of the Property against the judgment. 
Stanford did not preserve this argument be Low, but argues that we 
should nevertheless review it due to exceptional circumstances. 
See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, HH 11-12, 10 P.3d 346 
(reaffirming that "the exceptional circumstances exception is 
ill-defined and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The exceptional 
circumstances to which Stanford refers incLude that the facts 
implicating section 57-1-32 did not arise until after the 
judgment in this case was entered. Thus, Ln order to evaluate 
whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify our review of 
this unpreserved argument, we must first determine whether 
section 57-1-32 applies to the facts of this case. 
^16 Section 57-1-32 states, in pertinent part, 
At any time within three months after any 
sale of property under a trust desed as 
provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 
57-1-27, an action may be commenced to 
recover the balance due upon the obligation 
for which the trust deed was given as 
security, and in that action the complaint 
shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness that was secured by the trust 
deed, the amount for which the property was 
sold, and the fair market value of the 
property at the date of sale. Before 
3Stanford cites St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Dakota Electric Supply Co., 309 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1962), and 
Central Blacktop Co. v. Town of Cicero, 519 N.E.2d 972, 976 (111. 
App. Ct. 1988), arguing that "when a lender accepts a payment 
from a guarantor, and knows that the payment has come from the 
guarantor, the lender is required to apply that payment toward[] 
the guarantor's debt." (Emphasis added.) These cases are 
distinguishable because both were brought to recover under 
construction-related payment bonds and have different facts than 
in this case. 
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rendering judgment, the court shall find the 
fair market value of the property at the date 
of the sale. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which 
the amount of the indebtedness with interest, 
costs, and expenses of sale, including 
trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the 
fair market value of the property as of the 
date of the sale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (Supp. 2008) (emphases added). 
fl7 We conclude that section 57-1-32 is not applicable. The 
Property was subject to two trust deeds: the first was to secure 
the Security Mutual Note, the second is the subject of this 
lawsuit and secures the 1995 Trust Deed Note. Although Stanford 
was a guarantor of both trust deed notes, this action involved 
only the 1995 Trust Deed Note. Eventually, Bank of Utah 
succeeded Security Mutual on the Security Mutual deed and 
conducted a foreclosure sale. Because that foreclosure was on 
the first trust deed, not the second trust deed involved in this 
case, section 57-1-32 is not implicated. That section places 
limitations on a deficiency action after a trust deed sale. See 
id. Bank of Utah and the Parks waived any right to seek a 
deficiency judgment against Stanford related to the foreclosed 
Security Mutual deed, so Stanford is precluded from invoking 
section 57-1-32's protections and certainly cannot do so in this 
action involving a different obligation. We accordingly conclude 
that there are not exceptional circumstances sufficient to 
justify our review of this otherwise unpreserved argument. See 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11. 
CONCLUSION 
fl8 We find no clear error in the trial court's implicit finding 
that the 1995 Trust Deed Note was integrated with respect to 
Stanford's personal guaranty. We also determine that the 
guaranty provision in the 1995 Trust Deed Note is unambiguous as 
a matter of law and, therefore, consideration of parol evidence 
is improper. We further conclude that Stanford is not entitled 
to credit against his personal guaranty for payments made to the 
Parks prior to this action because there is no evidence that the 
Parks agreed to such an arrangement and he cannot otherwise 
control the application of these payments. As a result, the 
trial court appropriately granted summary judgment for the Parks. 
Finally, exceptional circumstances do not exist sufficient to 
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justify our review of Stanford's argument regarding application 
of Utah Code section 57-1-32. Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
19 WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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